The High Court has ruled that an appeal from a Circuit Court decision under section 115A of the Personal Insolvency Acts must be brought with the active and substantive engagement of a personal insolvency practitioner (PIP). It dismissed a debtor’s appeal because he had brought it in his own name, while leaving open whether the PIP could be substituted as appellant.
The ruling was a preliminary decision about the form of the appeal. It did not address whether the proposed Personal Insolvency Arrangement (PIA) should be approved or whether the Circuit Court was right to refuse approval.
A PIA proposed for Darren Reilly did not receive the required creditor support at a meeting on 23 November 2016. KBC Bank Ireland, which was owed about €600,000, voted in favour. Bank of Ireland, owed almost €720,000 and holding security over Reilly’s principal private residence, voted against it.
The personal insolvency practitioner, John Donnan, applied to the Circuit Court under section 115A for approval of the arrangement despite the creditor vote. On 1 June 2017, Circuit Court specialist judge William G. Lyster refused that application. Reilly then lodged an appeal to the High Court in his own name.
Bank of Ireland objected that the appeal was not valid because the statute requires the PIP to bring the application and the appeal. Reilly argued that his interests were directly affected and that he could pursue the appeal himself. The bank had offered to have the PIP substituted as appellant, but Reilly’s solicitor rejected the offer as unnecessary.
Justice Baker held that the PIP’s role under the statutory scheme was not merely administrative. The PIP must exercise professional judgment on whether there are reasonable grounds to seek court review, and the appeal remains within the procedural limits of the Circuit Court process. The judge concluded that a debtor could not initiate the application or appeal without the PIP’s active and substantive involvement.
The judge also rejected the argument that this requirement unlawfully denied access to the courts, finding that the legislation regulated how the statutory process could be brought. The court accepted that the decision could create practical questions about the PIP’s costs, but said those concerns did not alter the statutory interpretation.
The court upheld the bank’s preliminary objection and dismissed Reilly’s appeal as improperly constituted. Justice Baker said she would hear the parties on how the matter could proceed and whether an order substituting the PIP could or should be made. The judgment did not determine the merits of the proposed PIA.