The Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal by the Garda Commissioner over a decision to quash a section 14 dismissal process against Garda Raymond Hegarty. The court held that, in the circumstances, the Commissioner had no lawful basis to pursue dismissal for conduct already dealt with through a completed disciplinary process.
The case arose from an incident at Lismore Garda Station on 15 March 2017. Hegarty admitted two disciplinary breaches: discreditable conduct involving a sexual act with a complainant while on duty, and failing to record her statement properly. The complainant is anonymised in the judgment.
A Board of Inquiry recommended that Hegarty be required to resign as an alternative to dismissal for the first breach, and receive a two-week pay reduction for the second. The Commissioner accepted those recommendations in October 2018. On appeal, an independent Appeal Board upheld the findings but replaced the resignation requirement with a four-week pay reduction, finding the original sanction disproportionate. It left the two-week reduction for the second breach in place.
In March 2020, after the appeal process had concluded, the Commissioner initiated a separate process under section 14 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005. He stated that Hegarty’s continued membership would undermine public confidence and that dismissal was necessary. Hegarty was invited to make representations. The Commissioner had not made a final dismissal decision, and the police authority’s consent would also have been required.
The High Court quashed the section 14 process and related suspension. The Commissioner appealed, arguing that section 14 was a standalone power and that the judicial review challenge was premature because no final decision had been made.
The Court of Appeal rejected the prematurity argument: Hegarty’s challenge was that the process should not have been initiated at all, given the completed disciplinary proceedings and the risk of dismissal for the same conduct. The court accepted that section 14 is a free-standing power, but said it cannot operate “in a vacuum” without regard to what happened under the disciplinary regulations.
The judgment said the Appeal Board’s decision meant Hegarty was no longer at risk of dismissal through that disciplinary process. The later section 14 process revived that risk for the same conduct, despite the Appeal Board’s decision that resignation was disproportionate. The court concluded that this was inconsistent with constitutional justice in this case.
The court dismissed the appeal. It proposed that Hegarty receive his costs, subject to either party notifying the Court of Appeal Office within 28 days if they sought a different costs order. The judgment did not decide generally when section 14 might be used following disciplinary proceedings; it said that question did not need to be answered here.