The Supreme Court has ruled that a later decision to bring summary charges does not, by itself, make an earlier arrest or detention under section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 unlawful. It also held that the Director of Public Prosecutions was not barred from preferring summary charges after that power had been used.
The judgment, delivered by Chief Justice Murray on 19 December 2007, addressed two appeals by way of Case Stated concerning Terence Alcock and Jacqueline Alcock. Both arose from prosecutions following arrests in Cobh in October 2005. The Supreme Court answered four questions of law, but did not decide whether the statutory conditions for either detention had in fact been met.
The cases concerned the distinction between investigation and prosecution. The Court said the arresting Garda must have reasonable cause to suspect a relevant offence, and the member in charge of the station must independently have reasonable grounds to believe detention is necessary for the proper investigation. A prosecutor’s later choice of charges is a separate function. That choice may be part of the factual picture considered by the trial court, but is not decisive on its own.
The Alcocks had argued in the District Court that section 4 had not been validly invoked and that their charges should be dismissed. They also argued that the DPP was estopped from bringing summary charges after detention under the section. The District Court heard prosecution evidence on the preliminary issues and referred questions of law to the High Court. The High Court answered in a way adverse to the defendants’ submissions; the cases then came before the Supreme Court.
The source’s account of the underlying allegations says Terence was accused of assaulting David Parker with a hurley and of public-order and offensive-weapon offences. Jacqueline was accused of public-order and offensive-weapon offences involving a hammer. These are allegations recorded in the case stated, not findings of guilt.
The Supreme Court answered questions one, three and four in the negative: later summary charges did not automatically undermine the arresting Garda’s reasonable cause or the station member’s independent belief, and use of section 4 did not estop the DPP from preferring summary charges. It answered question two in the positive, meaning the District Court judge could conclude that the member in charge held the required independent belief if the evidence supported that conclusion. Whether the belief existed, and whether section 4 was properly used, remained factual matters for the District Court. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court’s answers were consistent with its own, though its reasoning differed.