The Supreme Court has ruled that the Minister for Justice can temporarily suspend orders made under section 47 of the International Protection Act 2015 so that the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT) can consider whether to accept an application to appeal late.
The court returned the cases of two anonymised applicants to the Minister. It directed that the Minister be informed of their intention to apply for an extension of time. The Minister can then decide whether to uphold or alter the section 47 orders. The court did not decide whether either applicant should receive an extension or whether any appeal against the International Protection Office (IPO) recommendations would succeed.
Both applicants’ IPO applications had been refused, and neither appealed within the prescribed period. The judgment does not state their reasons for missing the deadline, saying those reasons were not relevant to the appeal. Under the regulations discussed by the Court, an applicant refused by the IPO generally has 15 working days to appeal to IPAT. IPAT may extend that period where special circumstances explain the delay and it would be unjust not to do so.
The appeal concerned whether the legislation left the Minister powerless to restore an applicant’s ability to pursue a late appeal after applicant status had ended. The Court held that the Act did not clearly remove the Minister’s executive discretion to suspend a section 47 order for that purpose. It said the power could allow IPAT to assess an extension application while preserving the applicants’ fair procedure rights.
The Court stressed that suspension would not itself overturn an order or establish that an appeal should be heard. If IPAT refuses an extension, or hears and rejects an appeal, prior orders, including deportation orders, would take effect immediately. The Minister may also amend the regulations to provide for a discretionary appeal, the judgment said.
The Court concluded that the Act could not be interpreted as unconstitutional. Its decision addressed the Minister’s power and the next procedural step, not the merits of the applicants’ protection claims.