The Court of Criminal Appeal quashed a three-year prison sentence imposed on P. O’C. for indecently assaulting a 12-year-old pupil in 1982 and replaced it with a three-year term, suspending the final 12 months on conditions of probation supervision and sex offender therapy as directed by the Probation Service.
The court treated the application for leave to appeal as the hearing of the appeal. It found no error in principle in the original sentence, but concluded that part of the term should be suspended in light of the case’s history.
P. O’C. pleaded guilty in October 2008 to one count of indecent assault. The offence was alleged to have occurred at a primary school on an unknown date between 1 April and 30 June 1982. The Central Criminal Court sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment in February 2009.
The charge was the last of five separate trials arising from an indictment dating to 1998, which concerned allegations by five pupils identified in the judgment as A to E. The indictment was severed at the appellant’s request. Earlier proceedings resulted in an acquittal on one complainant’s allegations, convictions on complaints by B and C, and the quashing of the indictment relating to D. The appellant had served prison sentences for the B and C offences before the E case was resolved.
P. O’C. argued that the sentence effectively amounted to a consecutive term and that sentences for offences against several victims should generally run concurrently. He also argued that the sentencing judge had wrongly held the delay against him because he pursued judicial review and appeals. The Director of Public Prosecutions disputed that the sentence equated to a consecutive sentence.
The appeal court said the offences had not been tried together, so it could not be assumed that a court hearing all the charges at once would have imposed a total sentence of four years. It held that the delay was not an aggravating factor or a matter detrimental to the appellant, though its effect on the victim was relevant. The court also said that prior prison sentences for offences against other people did not, by themselves, mean there should be no prison term for this offence.
The court described the offence as falling in the lower middle of the scale, with a maximum sentence of 10 years. It considered the appellant’s late guilty plea, prior sentences, probation report and the harm to the victim, who had endured a decade awaiting trial. The court ordered that the final 12 months be suspended on condition that P. O’C. attend probation supervision and engage in sex offender therapy as directed.