The High Court has quashed the Minister for Justice and Equality’s refusal to grant subsidiary protection to a woman from the Democratic Republic of Congo and her two minor children, finding that the Minister relied completely on adverse credibility findings made during her earlier asylum appeal.
Mr Justice Mac Eochaidh ruled that the subsidiary protection decision did not amount to an effective hearing because the Minister made no independent and separate assessment of the woman’s claims. The judgment, delivered on 20 September 2013, says the protection application is a distinct process from an asylum appeal, even though it follows a refusal of refugee status.
The woman said she left Congo in 2007 after the arrest of her husband, whom she described as a senior member of a political group. She claimed authorities harassed her and threatened her and one of her children. Her asylum claim was refused, and the Refugee Appeals Tribunal upheld that decision in 2008, citing credibility concerns. That tribunal decision was not challenged.
When the woman later sought subsidiary protection, the Minister’s decision quoted the tribunal’s negative credibility findings and concluded she did not merit the benefit of the doubt. It also considered country information, state protection and internal relocation. The Minister argued in court that the protection claim rested on the same assertions as the failed asylum claim and that the decision could stand because protection and relocation had also been considered.
The judge followed an earlier High Court ruling in M.M. v Minister for Justice, which he said set out the requirements for assessing a subsidiary protection application. He found that the Minister had adopted the tribunal’s credibility findings without a fresh assessment and that this flaw could not be separated from the findings on state protection and internal relocation.
The court therefore quashed the Minister’s decision. It did not determine whether the woman or her children were entitled to subsidiary protection. The judge said it was unnecessary to address the other grounds raised by the applicants. He also criticised aspects of the decision’s structure and reasoning, but said he was not setting it aside on those grounds because they had not been pleaded.