The Supreme Court has allowed Jillian Godsil’s appeal against a High Court decision that refused her costs after legislation changed to let undischarged bankrupts run in domestic and European elections.
In a judgment delivered on 24 February 2015, Mr Justice William M. McKechnie directed that Godsil receive her full costs of the High Court action. The case before the Supreme Court concerned costs only: the underlying proceedings had been struck out as moot after the law changed, and the court did not rule on the merits of her challenge.
Godsil had been adjudicated bankrupt on 17 February 2014. She sought to contest the European Parliament election scheduled for 23 May that year, but the legislation then in force disqualified undischarged bankrupts from membership of the Dáil and the European Parliament. On 14 March, her solicitors wrote to the Minister for the Environment stating her intention to run and warning that proceedings would follow unless the law was amended. She issued proceedings on 20 March.
The Government approved an amending Bill on 1 April. It passed both Houses and was signed into law by the President on 16 April. The change removed the disqualification, and Godsil was able to submit nomination papers and run in the election. The High Court struck out the proceedings as moot on 30 April, awarded her High Court outlay but refused her application for costs.
Godsil argued that the respondents’ actions had made the case moot and that she should receive her costs. The respondents said the legislation was introduced for policy reasons and that the High Court judge had properly exercised discretion over costs. They also argued that she had delayed before raising the issue and had given them too little time to respond.
McKechnie rejected the criticism of her timing and found no conduct that should count against her on costs. He concluded that the change in law removed the precise legal obstacle challenged in the proceedings and that the respondents’ actions, in the shortened timeframe, were in direct response to the case. He treated that outcome as an “event” to which the usual rule that costs follow the event could apply.
The judgment did not determine whether the former restrictions were unconstitutional or incompatible with EU or human-rights law. The court said it was unnecessary to decide whether the case also qualified as a public-interest challenge.