The High Court has dismissed a woman’s claim over her detention and alleged treatment at St Joseph’s Industrial School in Clifden, finding that the passage of time created a real and serious risk of an unfair trial.
In a judgment delivered by Mr Justice Gilligan on 12 July 2007, the court declined to dismiss the proceedings for inordinate and inexcusable delay. It found that the delay was inordinate but excusable, having regard to medical reports describing the plaintiff’s difficulties with repressed memories and disclosing the full extent of her alleged experiences.
The defendants had also sought dismissal under the court’s inherent jurisdiction because of the lapse of time and the resulting prejudice to their ability to defend the claim. The judge granted that application.
The plaintiff’s claim concerned events during her detention at St Joseph’s, after a Dublin court ordered in November 1946 that she be sent to a certified industrial school under section 58 of the Children’s Act 1908. The order was to remain in force until she turned 16 in April 1960. Her claim alleged unlawful detention, physical and emotional abuse, deprivation, and sexual abuse. Those were allegations in the proceedings; the judgment did not decide whether they were true.
The judgment records that the plaintiff’s case had been due to proceed in February 2006, but was adjourned after further allegations of sexual abuse came to light during a consultation with her witnesses and counsellor. At the time of the judgment, the plaintiff was not yet ready to proceed with that part of her claim, and it was unclear when it would be ready.
The judge said the claims would require substantial oral evidence on disputed facts. The defendants’ affidavits described the loss of witnesses through death and advanced age. The court found both presumed and actual prejudice, which it characterised as substantial, and said no relevant defence witnesses remained available to give meaningful evidence.
While the defendants had raised the Statute of Limitations as a defence, the court’s dismissal was based on the lapse of time and the risk of an unfair trial, not a determination of that limitation defence. The court concluded that asking the defendants to answer the claims in the absence of the people involved would create basic procedural unfairness and “put justice to the hazard”.