The Supreme Court dismissed the Minister for Justice’s appeal seeking the surrender of Ciarán Francis Tobin to Hungary, ruling that his departure from the country did not meet the statutory meaning of “fled”.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Fennelly on 25 February 2008, gave reasons for a decision pronounced on 3 July 2007. The appeal concerned the meaning of “fled” in section 10 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003. The court considered the Minister’s appeal first; Tobin’s cross-appeal and notice to vary raised other points that were not decided in this judgment.
A Hungarian court issued a European Arrest Warrant on 12 October 2005 seeking Tobin’s surrender to serve a sentence for negligence causing death following a fatal road traffic accident in Hungary on 9 April 2000. Two children died. Tobin accepted that his car struck them and expressed sympathy to their family. He was convicted and sentenced in absentia in May 2002 to three years’ imprisonment, a driving ban and a fine. His sentence was later altered so he would serve half the term before release on what the translated decision called “ticket of leave”.
Tobin had left Hungary permanently in November 2000 after his employment there ended. The Supreme Court noted that his departure took place under arrangements approved by the Hungarian authorities. He had earlier been allowed to travel to Ireland while the investigation continued, after depositing 500,000 Hungarian forints in bail, and returned to Hungary in October 2000. Under the procedure he used, proceedings could take place in his absence; the judgment also records that no retrial would be available if he returned.
The High Court had refused surrender, finding that “fled” implied an intention to escape or evade justice, and that Tobin had left lawfully before trial. On appeal, the Minister argued that the word could include someone who left the issuing state and thereby evaded a sentence later imposed. Tobin maintained that he had not fled.
The Supreme Court held that fleeing necessarily suggested escape, haste or evasion, and that Tobin’s approved departure could not reasonably be described as flight. It also considered whether European law’s principle of conforming interpretation required a broader reading. The court held that the principle could not justify an interpretation contrary to the clear meaning of Irish legislation. Since section 10(d) required that the person had “fled”, the court said it could not order surrender without acting contra legem.
The appeal was dismissed. The judgment did not decide the other issues raised in Tobin’s cross-appeal and notice to vary.