The Supreme Court has dismissed another challenge arising from the sale of the Bula lead and zinc mine at Nevinstown, Navan, holding that the latest proceedings attempted to re-litigate issues which had already been finally resolved.
Bula Limited, Bula Holdings, Richard Wood and Michael Wymes appealed a 2005 High Court order dismissing their proceedings as an abuse of process. Their claims included allegations against receiver Laurence Crowley, Tara Mines, Outokumpu and several banks concerning the receiver’s sale of the mine assets to Tara Mines for £27.5 million.
The dispute followed decades of litigation over the Navan ore body. Earlier proceedings against Tara and others had occupied 277 High Court hearing days before being dismissed. Separate litigation had also been brought against the receiver and banks.
A central issue in the present appeal was a previous application under section 316 of the Companies Act 1963. In those proceedings, the receiver sought court directions and approval for the sale to Tara Mines. The High Court approved the transaction in 2002 and the Supreme Court later upheld that decision.
The appellants argued that the section 316 process had been narrow and had not determined the merits of their later damages claims. Ms Justice Denham rejected that submission. She held that the section 316 jurisdiction was broad enough to address matters connected with the receiver’s performance of his functions and that issues relevant to the propriety of the sale should have been raised then.
The court applied the principle of res judicata and the related rule against bringing successive proceedings over matters which were, or with reasonable diligence could have been, litigated earlier. The latest action was therefore an abuse of process.
The Supreme Court also upheld an Isaac Wunder order. Bula and the other appellants must obtain prior High Court permission before issuing further proceedings against the receiver, Tara Mines, Outokumpu or the specified banks. The court stressed that this was a filtering mechanism rather than an absolute bar on access to court.