Judgment: 2007-05-01 · Court archive

Supreme Court dismisses appeal to stop trial over alleged historic sexual offences

The court found the applicant had not shown a real risk of an unfair trial from the passage of time or the deaths of witnesses. The underlying charges remain for trial.

Supreme Court ·

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • B.J. (Applicant)
  • C.M.
  • Ms. S.
  • D.F.
What

The court found the applicant had not shown a real risk of an unfair trial from the passage of time or the deaths of witnesses. The underlying charges remain for trial.

Where

No place detail is included in this summary.

When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

In the Supreme Court, the main issue was whether the delay had caused prejudice serious enough to create a real risk of an unfair trial. The court said the reason for the complainant’s delay in reporting was no longer in issue under the applicable law. It also upheld the High Court’s factual finding about what a garda had told B.J. in 1991.

The Supreme Court has dismissed B.J.’s appeal against a High Court decision refusing to prohibit his trial on charges of alleged sexual offences against one complainant when she was a child. The court affirmed the High Court order; it did not determine whether the charges were proved.

The charges concern alleged conduct between January 1979 and June 1983. The complainant, identified as C.M. in the judgment, said she was aged between 12 and 16 during that period and worked part-time for B.J. in his shop. B.J. denies the charges.

The complainant made a statement to gardaí in September 1997. B.J. was arrested and questioned later that month, then charged in October 1998. Those charges were withdrawn in November 1999 and replaced by 49 sample charges. A new book of evidence was served in February 2000. B.J. sought to stop the prosecution, arguing that delay had prejudiced his defence and would prevent a fair trial. The High Court refused that application in December 2003.

In the Supreme Court, the main issue was whether the delay had caused prejudice serious enough to create a real risk of an unfair trial. The court said the reason for the complainant’s delay in reporting was no longer in issue under the applicable law. It also upheld the High Court’s factual finding about what a garda had told B.J. in 1991.

B.J. argued that four deceased witnesses could have assisted his defence. The judgment described two, Ms. S. and D.F., as potentially significant, but found that B.J. had not sufficiently explained what evidence they could have given or how their absence created a specific risk to the fairness of the trial. It said the other two witnesses did not establish his case either. The court declined to speculate about evidence that had not been set out.

The court also rejected the appeal ground concerning prosecutorial delay. It said B.J. had not established blameworthy prosecutorial delay, so it was unnecessary to consider whether any protected interest in an expeditious trial had been interfered with.

The Supreme Court concluded that the case advanced did not meet the burden required to prohibit the trial. It noted that issues raised in the application could still be raised at trial, where the trial judge would hear the evidence and give appropriate directions. The appeal was dismissed and the High Court order refusing prohibition was affirmed.

Read the original court judgment

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