The Supreme Court dismissed Donna Sfar’s appeal against the refusal of her judicial review challenge to the Revenue Commissioners’ decision not to fund her Bar Vocational Course. It found that the proceedings were brought outside the applicable time limit. The court also allowed her appeal against a separate finding that she had lacked candour, concluding that the omission of correspondence was not intended to mislead.
Ms Sfar, a civil servant based in Dundalk, sought a refund under the Revenue’s academic fees scheme for a distance-learning course with a private London college. The Revenue said the course was not accepted as relevant to its work and that her application lacked the required business case approved by an Assistant Secretary. Ms Sfar argued that the course qualified as “Legal Studies” under the scheme or was a follow-on course, and also raised legitimate expectation and EU law arguments.
The Revenue first rejected the application in March 2008, saying the business case did not support a refund. It refused again in July and November 2008. In January 2009, following a review, an Assistant Secretary upheld the refusal, citing the course’s relevance to Revenue’s business needs, Ms Sfar’s current employment and managers’ views. A letter in February 2010 reiterated that decision.
The Supreme Court held that the time limit began when the grounds for judicial review first arose, and that a demand for mandamus requires a refusal by the relevant public body. It treated the January 2009 review letter as the latest relevant refusal. Ms Sfar obtained leave to bring proceedings in March 2010, more than three months later. The later correspondence did not create a new decision or restart the clock. No application to extend the time limit for good reason had been made. The court held that the challenge was out of time and that the High Court was justified in dismissing it on that basis.
The court separately considered the High Court’s finding of lack of candour. Ms Sfar’s initial affidavit had omitted much of the correspondence, but she said she had kept it brief on advice and expected both sides to set out their positions as the case progressed. The Supreme Court found significant non-disclosure, but concluded it was not undertaken with an intention to mislead. It therefore allowed the appeal on that point.
The court did not decide whether the course fell within the scheme, whether Ms Sfar had a legitimate expectation of funding, or whether EU law entitled her to practise in Ireland after qualifying in the UK. Those issues did not arise once the appeal was dismissed on delay.