Judgment: 2024-06-17 · Court archive

Supreme Court quashes McAreavey conviction over meaning of assisting-offender law

The Court ruled that a prosecution must link an accused’s belief about another arrestable offence to the facts of the offence actually committed. It said that link was not established in this case.

The Supreme Court · [2024] IESC 23

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • Gary McAreavey
  • Mr Smyth
  • Mr Gately
  • Maurice Collins (Judge)
What

The Court ruled that a prosecution must link an accused’s belief about another arrestable offence to the facts of the offence actually committed. It said that link was not established in this case.

Where

Places mentioned in the report

  • Newrath, Co Louth
When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Maurice Collins on 17 June 2024, concerned the meaning of section 7(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1997. The Court held that when the prosecution relies on an accused’s belief in “some other arrestable offence”, it must allege and prove that the belief concerned an offence of a similar nature or within the same category as the offence actually committed, arising from the same circumstances.

The Supreme Court has quashed Gary McAreavey’s conviction for assisting an offender, ruling that it was not enough to infer he believed the principal offender had committed an unspecified serious crime.

The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Maurice Collins on 17 June 2024, concerned the meaning of section 7(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1997. The Court held that when the prosecution relies on an accused’s belief in “some other arrestable offence”, it must allege and prove that the belief concerned an offence of a similar nature or within the same category as the offence actually committed, arising from the same circumstances.

The prosecution case was that, after the shooting of Mr Gately, McAreavey drove in convoy with a black Lexus driven by Mr Smyth to a remote location near Newrath, Co Louth, where the vehicle was burned out. The indictment alleged that McAreavey bought petrol and helped destroy a vehicle used in the attempted murder, intending to impede Smyth’s apprehension or prosecution.

The Special Criminal Court was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that McAreavey knew or believed Smyth was guilty of attempted murder. It nevertheless convicted him, finding that he knew or believed Smyth had committed an arrestable offence “of some description” and intended to impede his apprehension or prosecution. The Court of Appeal upheld that interpretation, and McAreavey’s appeal there was dismissed.

The Supreme Court rejected the broad interpretation adopted by the lower courts. Justice Collins said section 7(2) did not permit conviction based only on a belief that the principal offender must have committed some serious arrestable offence, without identifying an offence or connecting the belief to the actual offence’s circumstances. The Court concluded that the prosecution had not alleged or proved that McAreavey knew facts about the offence Smyth committed but believed those facts amounted to a different, similar offence.

The Supreme Court also rejected McAreavey’s separate challenge to the admission of mobile phone traffic and location data. It held that the data was properly admitted under the test in People (DPP) v JC, despite a breach of Charter rights arising from later legal developments. The Court said the breach was not deliberate or conscious and that it could determine admissibility without a retrial.

The appeal on admissibility therefore failed, but the appeal on the interpretation of section 7(2) succeeded. The Court said the conviction must be quashed. Any consequential orders were left for further argument; the judgment did not specify them.

Read the original court judgment

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