The High Court has allowed an architect to remain a third party in a personal injuries action against one defendant, while striking out the notice joining him on behalf of another defendant.
In a judgment delivered on 25 July 2007, McCarthy J. considered whether the defendants had issued third-party notices against the architect “as soon as is reasonably possible”, as required by the Civil Liability Act 1961. The architect sought to set aside both notices.
The plaintiff’s claim concerns a fall from a window at Millstream Court in Ennis on 18 August 2002. She alleges that she fell about 45 feet and suffered extensive injuries. Her case alleges negligence and breaches of statutory and contractual duties relating to the condition of the apartment. Those are claims in the underlying action, not findings made in this judgment.
The first defendant, described as the plaintiff’s landlord, applied to join the architect, who had agreed to design, supervise and certify construction of the apartment complex. The court found that this defendant’s application was made in time. It treated the relevant delay as the 10 months between receiving replies to a notice for particulars on 18 November 2003 and issuing the joinder motion on 19 August 2004. The judge considered that it was reasonable to await the replies, which sought information relevant to the potential claim against the architect.
The process was later delayed by an unissued notice being served in error and a further delay before the notice was properly issued and served. The judge considered those circumstances but concluded that, in this case, the first defendant had acted as soon as reasonably possible for the purposes of the Act.
The second defendant’s application to join the architect came after a much longer period of inaction. The judge accepted that administrative errors and uncertainty over insurance indemnity contributed to the delay. But the information available to the insurer should have prompted consideration of joining the architect earlier. The judge concluded that the second defendant had not acted as soon as reasonably possible.
The court therefore refused the architect’s application to set aside the first defendant’s notice and granted it in relation to the second defendant’s notice. The judgment addressed the timing of the third-party notices; it did not determine the plaintiff’s underlying personal injury claim or liability for the alleged fall.