The Court of Appeal has dismissed a probationary Garda’s appeal over the continuation of a suspension imposed while disciplinary proceedings remained active.
J.M. had initially been suspended following an incident on 24 August 2020. A rape allegation arising from the incident was later withdrawn by the complainant, and the Director of Public Prosecutions decided in April 2022 that there should be no prosecution.
The Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission subsequently recommended disciplinary proceedings for alleged discreditable conduct and driving while intoxicated. Those proceedings began in June 2023 and remained before a Board of Inquiry in 2024.
J.M.’s suspension was renewed for three months from 1 May 2024. A notice stated that it arose from the circumstances surrounding his sexual activity with an intoxicated minor and the ongoing disciplinary process.
On 18 July 2024, his solicitors sought extensive documents relating to past and future suspension decisions, requested an oral hearing and called for the suspension to be lifted. The Commissioner received the letter on 24 July. An Assistant Commissioner decided on 29 July to continue the suspension from 1 August to 1 November.
J.M. then brought judicial review proceedings. He argued, among other things, that he had not been given sufficient material or reasons and that the Commissioner had failed to engage with his submissions.
The Court of Appeal majority dismissed his appeal. In a separate concurring judgment, Mr Justice Alexander Owens agreed with that outcome while giving additional reasons.
He held that J.M. already knew the substance of the case underlying his suspension and was not entitled to the wide-ranging file disclosure sought. The July letter contained no new factual material requiring a specific response before the suspension decision.
Mr Justice Owens also considered the reasons given for the renewed suspension sufficient. He said the continuing disciplinary process provided an obvious basis for maintaining a holding suspension and that courts should not substitute their own judgment for the Commissioner’s where the statutory power was being used for a legitimate purpose.