The High Court found that J. H. was unlawfully detained under the Mental Treatment Act 1945 and ordered his release at 6 p.m. on 8 January 2007. The court allowed several hours for the authorities to prepare a fresh detention application under the Mental Health Act 2001, but did not rule on that later process.
Mr Justice Clarke delivered his reasoned judgment on 6 February 2007, after announcing the order on 8 January. J. H. had been detained at Cavan General Hospital under an order made on 20 March 2006 and extended in September. The case was an inquiry under Article 40.4.2 of the Constitution into the lawfulness of his detention.
The judgment traced earlier periods of detention beginning in March 2003. Under the 1945 Act, temporary patient orders could last for six months and be extended, subject to a maximum of 24 months. J. H. became a voluntary patient in March 2005, but the judge was not satisfied that this period was genuinely voluntary. He found that J. H. had therefore been detained beyond the statutory maximum.
The court also found that the March 2006 order was invalid. The 1945 Act required a reasonable basis to believe the patient would recover within six months. The evidence did not support that expectation when the new order was made. The judge concluded that the detention was unlawful by 1 November 2006, when the relevant provisions of the 2001 Act came into force, and that its transitional provisions did not cure the earlier invalidity.
A separate challenge concerned the identity of the person who made the original 2003 application. The court did not decide its merits, finding that the issue could not at that stage affect the validity of detention as of 1 November 2006.
J. H. also argued that the treatment provided was inadequate. The judge accepted that treatment conditions could, in theory, make an otherwise lawful detention unlawful if there were a complete failure to provide appropriate conditions or treatment. He did not find that ground established here. He said any claim to treatment beyond what had been provided would need to be pursued in proceedings suited to determining those entitlements, rather than this narrow detention inquiry.
The judge considered that immediate release alone might not be appropriate in the circumstances and made an ancillary order setting the release time to facilitate a fresh application under the 2001 Act. The judgment records that such an application was subsequently processed, but makes clear that its conduct was outside the case. J. H. remained free to bring a separate challenge to that process.