The High Court has refused Stryker Ireland Limited’s application to set aside orders renewing a personal injury summons and allowing a duplicate summons to be sealed and served. The ruling leaves those orders in place; it does not decide the underlying injury claim or determine liability.
Gerard Byrne’s summons, issued in August 2014, alleges that a Stryker implant inserted during a 2009 right hip replacement caused complications and that he later underwent revision surgery. The proceedings also named surgeon Maurice Neligan and UPMC Beacon Hospital. The judgment records that Byrne’s new solicitor intended to discontinue against those two defendants and pursue Stryker alone.
The summons was not served within its initial 12-month period. In May 2016, on an ex parte application, the court extended the time to apply for renewal and renewed it for six months. In July 2016, the court separately permitted a duplicate summons to be sealed and served in place of the original, which the solicitor said could not be found.
Stryker asked the High Court to set aside both orders. It argued that the solicitors’ explanations—including a medical opinion received in January 2015, the transfer of Byrne’s file between offices, and a breakdown in the former firm—did not amount to good reason for the delay. It also argued that the delay could impair its ability to defend the claim. Byrne’s side relied on the earlier notice letter to Stryker, the explanation for the file’s loss within the former firm, and the hardship he would face if his claim became time-barred. His solicitor also referred to Byrne’s cancer diagnosis.
Justice Eagar applied the approach in which the court considers whether there was good reason for renewal, whether renewal serves the interests of justice, and how the hardship balances between the parties. He found that the dispute between partners in the former firm and the resulting communication breakdown explained the delay, and that the solicitor acted promptly after the file was discovered. The judge also considered Stryker to have been put on notice before the proceedings began.
The court found that the balance of hardship favoured leaving the summons in place, noting that Byrne’s claim would be time-barred if Stryker succeeded and that his health had to be considered. It refused the relief sought by Stryker. The ruling concerns the renewal and duplicate-summons orders only; it makes no final finding on the alleged defect, injury, or liability.