The High Court has permitted the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration to appeal two legal questions arising from a successful challenge by an Angolan international protection applicant whose judicial review proceedings were commenced outside the statutory time limit.
Mr Justice Garrett Simons certified the questions for the Court of Appeal on July 10, 2026. The ruling does not reverse the High Court's earlier finding that the International Protection Appeals Tribunal decision was legally flawed; instead, it allows an appeal on how the court dealt with the late commencement of the challenge.
The Tribunal had refused to recognise G. (Angola) as a refugee or as entitled to subsidiary protection, finding in effect that his claim lacked general credibility. The 28-day period for bringing a judicial review challenge expired on July 11, 2024, but the leave application was not made until August 15, about five weeks late.
Leave for judicial review was granted in December 2024 without finally resolving the time issue. That meant the extension application and the substantive challenge were later heard together.
In a principal judgment delivered on March 11, 2026, the High Court found that the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of credibility and also held there was good and sufficient reason to extend time. Among the factors considered were the absence of actual delay to the substantive hearing, the respondents' delay in filing opposition papers, the comparative prejudice to the parties and the fact that the judicial review had succeeded on its merits.
The Minister sought permission to appeal five proposed points. The court certified two.
The first asks whether, after hearing an out-of-time judicial review in full, a judge may consider the successful merits of that challenge when deciding whether to extend time. The second asks whether the respondents' conduct after leave was granted may be considered when assessing prejudice and good and sufficient reason.
Mr Justice Simons found sufficient uncertainty and differing High Court approaches on those issues to justify appellate clarification. He refused certification of the remaining proposed questions, finding that they concerned settled principles or their application to the facts rather than points of law of exceptional public importance.