The High Court refused to surrender a woman to Lithuania under a European arrest warrant, finding that the evidence did not establish that a decision had been made to try her for the alleged offence.
Mr Justice Edwards delivered the judgment on 31 May 2013. The warrant sought the respondent for prosecution over four offences, but the Minister for Justice and Equality ultimately sought surrender only for one: an alleged fraud offence concerning travel arrangements made in 1998. The court said the other offences were outside the request before it: correspondence could not be established for one, and Lithuania had no immediate intention to prosecute the other two.
The alleged fraud involved agreements and promised trips made through two companies in Kaunas. The warrant alleged that the respondent failed to arrange the trips or repay the money and acquired property by deceit, with a stated total of 135,737 Lithuanian litas. These were allegations, not findings of guilt.
The respondent disputed the allegations in an affidavit. She said she had worked for the companies but did not own or manage them, and said she had no knowledge of the alleged fraud. She also relied on her family circumstances and the time that had passed since the events.
The central issue was whether Lithuania had decided to charge and try her, as required by section 21A of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003. Lithuanian authorities said she was sought for criminal prosecution and that it was intended to charge her. But in response to a question about whether she would be put on trial, they said that would happen if sufficient evidence had been gathered.
Justice Edwards found that this conditional answer suggested a decision to try the respondent had not yet been made. He said the statutory test required decisions both to charge and to try her. Although the court found evidence of a decision to charge, it was satisfied that no decision to try had been made. It therefore refused surrender under section 21A.
The court separately rejected the respondent’s objection that surrender would disproportionately interfere with her family life under section 37(1). It acknowledged very considerable and largely unexplained delay, but found the evidence did not show that surrender would cause harm sufficient to outweigh the public interest. That conclusion did not change the outcome: the court was barred from ordering surrender by its section 21A finding.