The High Court has affirmed a Circuit Court decision against a woman who sued a car seller over a Ford Focus destroyed by fire, finding that although an electrical fault was the more likely cause, she had not proved the facts needed to succeed in her claim.
In a judgment delivered on 14 March 2005, Finnegan P. said the fire most likely began because of an electrical fault in the car’s engine compartment. The alternative explanation advanced by the defendant, arson using flammable material and an aerosol behind the front fender, was “much less likely”, the judge said.
The plaintiff said she bought the car from Harmonstown Motor Limited and later brought it to the company for a service. She claimed breach of contract, negligence and breach of duty, alleging the fire resulted from an electrical short. Alternatively, she relied on the legal doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The company’s case was that the fire was arson or could not have been caused by an electrical short.
The car caught fire on 11 March 2002, about half an hour after the plaintiff returned from a local shop and parked outside her house. The fire was confined to the engine compartment, and the judgment records no evidence of forced entry. The plaintiff’s engineering witnesses attributed the fire to electrical damage; the defendant’s engineer pointed to a tool mark on the fender lining and said the fire was likely deliberately set. A Ford Motor Company electrical engineer said he found no wire damaged along its full length, as he would expect if a short had caused the fire.
The judge said the engine compartment could only be accessed with a key and accepted that the fire could have resulted either from an electrical fault or the arson method described by the defence. He nevertheless found the electrical explanation more probable. He said the significant fire could have obscured evidence that a single wire had short-circuited and burned along its length.
That finding did not establish liability. To succeed against the seller, the plaintiff had to show that the defect existed when the car was sold; the judge said there was no evidence on that point. For the service claim, he said there was no evidence that a routine service required the garage to carry out tests that would reveal a wiring defect. The plaintiff had described occasional shocks when opening or closing the driver’s door, but the judge said there was no evidence she had told the garage about them. He was not satisfied that res ipsa loquitur could make up for those evidential gaps.
The judge found that the plaintiff had not established the facts necessary to succeed and affirmed the Circuit Court judge’s decision. He said he would hear counsel on the appropriate costs order; the judgment does not state a final costs order.