The Supreme Court has rejected a series of procedural challenges brought by John Gilligan, Geraldine Gilligan and other family members in Proceeds of Crime Act proceedings dating from 1996.
The case arose after then Chief Superintendent Michael F. Murphy obtained an interim freezing order in November 1996 over specified property. A further order under section 3 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 was made by Mr Justice Moriarty on July 16, 1997. Such an order freezes property found to meet the statutory proceeds-of-crime test and can remain in force until later disposal proceedings are determined.
The appeals before the Supreme Court did not finally determine whether particular properties were or were not proceeds of crime. Instead, they concerned how the statutory procedures could be used and whether earlier orders could still be challenged.
Mr Justice Geoghegan upheld a High Court ruling that section 3(3), which permits a freezing order to be varied or discharged where property is shown not to be proceeds of crime or where the order causes injustice, could not be used to judicially review the procedure by which another High Court judge originally made the order. The relevant "injustice", he held, was an injustice caused by the continuing order, not an alleged procedural injustice leading to its creation.
The Supreme Court also refused applications to extend the time for appealing the 1997 order and earlier orders. The delays were measured in years, and the court held that no sufficient basis had been shown for reopening the appeal period.
A further appeal argued that later proceedings seeking a disposal order under section 4 were invalid because they had been commenced by special summons. That challenge was also rejected. The court held that the procedure was permitted under the Rules of the Superior Courts and caused no injustice.
The appeals considered in the judgment were dismissed and the relevant motions refused. However, the judgment indicated that substantive arguments about whether particular property was actually the proceeds of crime could still potentially be raised through mechanisms provided by the Act, subject to abuse-of-process principles.