The Court of Appeal has dismissed William Jones’s appeal against the striking out of his defamation claim against Coolmore Stud over a 2017 letter to a bookseller about his self-published book, *The Black Horse Inside Coolmore*.
In a judgment delivered on 27 April 2020, Ms Justice Donnelly, with whom Ms Justice Faherty and Mr Justice Haughton agreed, upheld the High Court order. The claim was struck out under Order 19, rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts because it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was frivolous and vexatious. The appeal court did not decide whether the book was defamatory.
Mr Jones, a former Coolmore employee, had worked for the thoroughbred breeding and racing business for about nine years. After an employment complaint was compromised in December 2014, he retired in January 2015 and received €30,000. The written agreement included commitments not to disclose records relating to animals or clients and not to make derogatory comments about the company. Mr Jones published his book in November 2015. Earlier proceedings found it breached the agreement, although Mr Jones claimed he had entered the agreement under duress.
Coolmore’s solicitors later wrote to booksellers and distributors, including Gardner’s Books Ltd. The 2017 letter said the book breached the agreement, copyright and Coolmore’s intellectual property rights, and linked to judgments in the earlier litigation. Mr Jones’s present proceedings, issued in March 2018, sought damages for defamation. He identified the 2017 letter as the basis of his claim.
The Court of Appeal said its earlier ruling in the 2016 proceedings had established that a person who believes a publication may defame them can alert a distributor or seller, including by warning of possible proceedings. That legal principle applied even though the earlier ruling arose from an interlocutory application. Whether the book was actually defamatory, whether a claim might be time-barred, and the letter’s reference to Irish law sent to a UK bookseller did not alter the entitlement to send such a warning.
The court recognised that a letter written without justification, in bad faith and to cause damage rather than defend the writer’s rights could potentially give rise to a claim. But it found Mr Jones had not pleaded facts amounting to malice in law. The stated aim of getting the book withdrawn to protect Coolmore’s reputation did not establish malice, because the earlier ruling had treated such warnings as a legitimate legal step. The court also said it was unnecessary to decide qualified privilege: it saw no cause of action, and in any event found no legally sufficient allegation of malice to defeat that defence.
Although the 2017 letter went to a different recipient from the earlier letters, the court said the underlying legal issues had already been decided. It agreed that bringing the new proceedings to relitigate those issues was vexatious and would impose further expense on Coolmore. The appeal was dismissed.