The High Court refused an application to quash a District Court judge’s refusal to grant a separate legal aid certificate for charges prosecuted by Garda Jason Reilly. Mr Justice Meenan held that one certificate already covered those charges and the related Store Street charges, and that the judge had no legal authority to split it.
The judicial review concerned four charges brought in April 2015. Two arose from alleged offences at a Londis shop on Store Street, Dublin 1: assault and breach of the peace. Two further charges, brought by Garda Reilly, concerned alleged theft at a Spar shop on Vernon Avenue, Clontarf, and failure to appear in court.
On 28 April 2015, the applicant appeared before the District Court and was granted bail subject to conditions. A legal aid certificate was also granted. It covered the Store Street assault charge, but not the breach of the peace charge, as well as both charges brought by Garda Reilly.
At a return hearing on 26 May, the applicant’s solicitor sought a new certificate for the Garda Reilly charges. The solicitor argued that they arose from a separate prosecution, involving different alleged offences and dates. The District Court judge said he thought “one certificate is enough”.
The applicant sought certiorari, arguing that the refusal was unreasonable and that the statutory criteria for legal aid had been met. The Minister for Justice and Equality argued that the charges were already covered by the existing certificate and that the District Court judge had no jurisdiction to grant a second one. The Minister also argued that the challenge was a late collateral attack on the April decision and that the applicant had suffered no prejudice; the applicant had pleaded guilty to both charges, the Minister said.
Mr Justice Meenan distinguished the case from *Horvath v District Judge Bryan Smith*, where a judge had extended a certificate to cover additional charges in separate prosecutions. Here, both sets of charges were before the District Court when the original certificate was granted. The May application sought, in effect, to split that certificate. The judge said the statute and regulations provided no authority for doing so.
The court acknowledged that one certificate covering both prosecutions could mean substantial work for the solicitor for little return, but noted that the applicant’s guilty pleas mitigated that effect. It refused the requested certiorari order. The judgment did not quash the May refusal or grant a separate certificate.