The Supreme Court allowed an appeal against an order directing the appellant’s surrender to Poland, finding that the information before the High Court was wholly inadequate to establish that he had “fled” Poland under section 10 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003.
The judgment, delivered by Macken J on 25 March 2010, set aside the High Court’s order. The Court’s decision was limited to the material presented on this European arrest warrant. It did not decide the appellant’s two other objections to surrender.
The Polish warrant sought the appellant’s surrender to serve a one-year prison sentence that had been conditionally suspended, with “a curator’s supervision” imposed. Polish information stated that execution of the sentence was ordered on 4 November 2005, after it was established that the appellant had left Poland. It also said he was detained at Dublin Airport on 4 April 2005 while smuggling 500g of cocaine, and was later sentenced in Ireland to seven years’ imprisonment for that offence.
The High Court had concluded that the appellant left Poland after the sentence was imposed and before serving it, and therefore fell within section 10. On appeal, the appellant argued that the evidence did not establish that he had fled within the section’s meaning. The Minister submitted that the warrant and the lifting of the suspension supported an inference that the appellant had breached the supervision conditions by leaving Poland.
The Supreme Court said the High Court had no information about the conditions of the suspension, what “curator’s supervision” involved, which conditions were allegedly breached, or whether leaving Poland breached them. Nor was there information showing that the suspension terms had been imposed in the appellant’s presence, which could have supported a conclusion that he knew them. The Court distinguished an earlier case, MJELR v Sliczynski, where such information had been available.
The Court concluded that the evidence did not provide a proper basis to find that the appellant came within section 10 as someone who had fled Poland. It therefore held that he could not be surrendered under section 16 on the information supplied for this warrant, allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court order. Because of that conclusion, it did not address the appellant’s other objections: whether section 10 applied because he had not fled after sentence, whether the alleged offence met the statutory requirements, or whether he had already served the required penalty in Ireland.