The Court of Criminal Appeal has refused an application by Thomas Ulrich for a certificate allowing him to appeal to the Supreme Court on a question about the use of previous convictions in sentencing.
The application concerned section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924, as amended. A certificate could be granted only if the Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision involved a point of law of exceptional public importance and it was desirable in the public interest for the Supreme Court to consider it.
Ulrich asked whether previous convictions could aggravate the circumstances or nature of an offence enough to justify a heavier sentence, and whether a sentence could be imposed to prevent or reduce reoffending. The court held that the question, as framed, did not arise from its earlier decision on his case. It said the earlier decision had found that taking account of his Spanish drugs conviction was not an error in principle, but had not decided the broader question he now sought to refer.
Ulrich had pleaded guilty to importing drugs, contrary to section 15B of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison, with the final three years suspended on the usual bond. He had been detained at Dublin Airport, where drugs valued at approximately €240,000 were found in his possession or under his control. The judgment described him as a German national who had been living in Spain and said he had a prior drugs conviction there.
In seeking leave to appeal against the severity of sentence, Ulrich’s counsel had argued that a prior conviction for which a person had already served a sentence could not be used to increase a later sentence. The respondent’s counsel had argued that prior convictions could be considered in structuring a sentence. The court said its earlier decision had found that considering Ulrich’s Spanish conviction was not an error in principle.
In refusing the certificate, the court said prior convictions of a relevant nature could be considered when constructing an appropriate sentence, provided the sentence did not punish a person twice for the same offence and remained appropriate. It rejected the argument that prior convictions could only be reflected through the gradual loss of the mitigating effect of having no previous convictions. The court said the sentencing judge should decide how prior convictions are relevant in the individual case.
The court also found that the application had not established a point of law of exceptional public importance or shown why a certificate was desirable in the public interest. The respondent did not formally oppose the application. The court refused it.