The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by Richard Wood and Michael Wymes over interest claimed on a High Court costs debt, ruling that the Minister could calculate six years of recoverable interest backwards from the particulars of demand for the bankruptcy summons under challenge.
In a judgment delivered on 26 July 2017, Ms Justice Dunne addressed an outstanding issue left from an earlier judgment of 9 March 2017. The appeals had already failed on other issues. The remaining question was whether the Minister’s interest calculation was overstated because it used an eight per cent rate throughout the six-year period claimed.
The High Court had ordered Wood and Wymes to pay costs in February 1997. The costs were taxed, and a final certificate setting their amount at €3,297,493.33 issued on 31 July 2003. Bankruptcy summonses in the proceedings now at issue were issued on 15 February 2010. The particulars of demand dated 25 September 2009 sought €1,584,242.26 in interest at eight per cent for six years, bringing the stated principal and interest total to €4,881,735.59.
Wymes argued that the six-year period should run from the 1997 costs order, or alternatively be counted back from the first demand, served on 20 January 2009. On either approach, he said, part of the period fell when a two per cent interest rate applied, making the sum claimed too high. He relied in part on the statutory limit on recovery of interest arrears and on an earlier Supreme Court decision about interest on costs.
The Minister argued that a fresh demand was permitted after the earlier bankruptcy summonses were dismissed, and that the relevant six years should be counted back from the new particulars of demand.
Justice Dunne held that liability for interest on costs arose from the date of the costs order, even before the costs were quantified. But the statutory six-year limit applied to interest that had accrued and was being recovered; it did not require the recoverable period to begin on the date of judgment. The court could therefore calculate the six-year period backwards from the particulars of demand.
The Minister was also entitled to begin the bankruptcy process again after the earlier summonses were dismissed, and to serve new particulars stating the amount then due. The relevant period was therefore counted back from the particulars for the summonses now in issue, rather than from the first demand. The court concluded that the interest was not overstated and dismissed the appeal. The judgment resolved that remaining interest-calculation issue; it did not reverse the earlier decisions on the other issues.