The Supreme Court allowed A. O’G’s appeal after finding that the Residential Institutions Redress Board should have extended the deadline for her compensation application.
The appeal concerned the Board’s refusal in August 2011 to extend the time limit under section 8(2) of the Residential Institutions Redress Act 2002. A. O’G had said she did not learn about the scheme until 2008, after the ordinary application deadline of 15 December 2005 had passed. The High Court refused her judicial review application in 2012, although the judge said he would have interpreted “exceptional circumstances” differently if not bound by earlier High Court decisions.
The Supreme Court said the 2002 Act was remedial and that the Board had to assess the individual facts of her case. The Board’s own criteria included mental or physical health problems, family circumstances, communication difficulties and problems obtaining legal advice where they prevented or inhibited a timely application.
The only expert medical evidence before the Board was a report from consultant psychiatrist Dr Mary McGuire. It attributed A. O’G’s delay to psychological distress, social isolation and suppression of memories of childhood abuse, and said her ongoing psychological problems impaired her capacity to bring a claim. The Supreme Court said the Board gave no reason for rejecting the report and had not told A. O’G in advance that it had concerns about it. In those circumstances, the court said the Board’s decision had to be treated as based on acceptance of the report’s analysis.
Applying the Board’s criteria to that evidence, the Supreme Court found that the factors prevailing at the relevant time met the test for exceptional circumstances. It also held that, on the evidence, there was only one conclusion the Board could reach. The court concluded that the Board had erred in exercising its discretion and should have extended the time for A. O’G’s application.
The judgment records that the Board’s power to consider late applications was later closed by a 2011 amendment, which barred consideration of applications made on or after 17 September 2011. The court described its decision as generally of historic relevance for that reason.