The High Court has concluded that Jason Mulligan’s conviction for refusing to give a Garda his name and address was in error, after finding that a person must be told when a statutory power is being used to compel those details and that refusal is an offence.
Mr Justice Charleton delivered the judgment on 29 October 2008 in an appeal by way of case stated. The appeal arose from a District Court conviction following a charge under section 24 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994.
The charge concerned an incident on 24 March 2007 at Ballyfermot Road, Ballyfermot, Dublin 10. Garda Linda Ryan was the sole prosecution witness. The District Judge found that she came across Mr Mulligan asleep, woke him and formed the opinion that he was intoxicated. She decided to arrest him for his own safety and twice asked for his name and address. He refused.
The District Judge also found that Garda Ryan did not refer to section 24(2) when making the demand and did not tell Mr Mulligan that failing to provide his details would be an offence. The District Judge rejected the defence submission that the prosecution had not shown a demand made under the statutory power, and found the charge proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The High Court distinguished an informal request for information from a compulsory demand backed by a criminal sanction. Gardaí may make informal enquiries, the judgment said, but failing to answer such a request is not an offence. Where they use a statutory power of compulsion, the person must be informed of the power and the consequences of refusal.
The court said no technical wording or citation of a section was required. A Garda must, in substance, communicate that they have a power under the relevant legislation to demand the details and that withholding them is an offence. The judgment said these principles applied to section 24(2).
The case stated asked the High Court to address the prosecution’s proof obligations and whether the District Judge was correct to convict on the evidence. Mr Justice Charleton concluded that the conviction was in error. The supplied judgment does not set out a separate order quashing the conviction or any further directions.