The High Court found that the Minister for Justice and Equality’s refusal to grant Edward Ryan enhanced remission was based on an impermissible criterion. The court said the refusal letter referred to granting the concession only “sparingly and in the most exceptional cases”, a restriction that rewrote the applicable Prison Rule. The judge left the appropriate order to be determined after hearing the parties.
Ryan was serving concurrent six-year sentences for possession of a firearm and ammunition in suspicious circumstances. He applied in December 2013 for remission of one third of his sentence under Rule 59(2) of the Prison Rules 2007. The Minister refused in April 2014, saying his application had not demonstrated that he was less likely to reoffend.
Ryan first challenged the refusal through an application for release under Article 40.4 of the Constitution. The High Court ordered his release, but the Supreme Court quashed that order, holding that complaints about the remission decision should be pursued by judicial review. The Supreme Court did not examine the merits of the refusal. Ryan was returned to custody, and the present judicial review was heard on 30 and 31 October 2014.
The Minister’s decision was challenged on several grounds, including that the “most exceptional cases” wording unlawfully constrained the discretion provided by Rule 59(2). Ryan’s submissions also described his work in the prison carpentry workshop and contested claims that he had failed to engage with available services. The Minister’s evidence said he had not engaged with probation, psychology or integrated sentence management services and that attendance at structured activities did not, by itself, establish reduced reoffending risk.
Justice Iseult O’Malley rejected the argument that participation in authorised activities necessarily required the Minister to find a prisoner less likely to reoffend and better able to reintegrate. The rule left the Minister to assess the information about the individual prisoner and permitted consideration of other relevant information. But an application still had to be considered fairly and rationally.
The judge found that the refusal letter’s “most exceptional cases” language had not been properly explained. She concluded that it appeared to be a criterion adopted by the decision-maker and that it rewrote Rule 59(2). The court therefore could not say with confidence that the decision had been made on the material before the Minister; it was compelled to conclude that the decision rested on an impermissibly narrow interpretation of the rule.
The judgment, delivered on 4 November 2014, concluded by inviting submissions on the appropriate order. It did not specify a final remedy in the text provided.