The High Court has quashed two decisions refusing to vary the immigration permissions of Zimbabwean step-siblings who sought permission to work in Ireland. The court found the decision-maker had applied policy too rigidly, without meaningfully considering whether their family circumstances justified an exception.
In a judgment delivered on 19 July 2017, Ms Justice Faherty granted orders of certiorari quashing the refusals, which had been issued in January 2014. The cases were heard together in a telescoped judicial review. The court also extended the time for the siblings to bring the proceedings, finding that they had sufficiently explained the delay.
The siblings, both born in 1988, had been living in Ireland since around March 2011 on Stamp 3 permissions, which did not allow them to work. They had originally been admitted as an exceptional measure to help care for their ill parents and younger siblings. Their father later left the family unit, and their mother, an Irish citizen, worked full time while managing rheumatoid arthritis. One younger brother had a serious condition requiring surgery.
The applications challenged in court were made in May 2013. The siblings argued that their mother’s health and financial pressures, their caring responsibilities and their job offers should have been considered when the Minister decided whether to grant Stamp 4 permissions. The Minister’s refusal letters said they were not entitled to Stamp 4 as adult family dependants and would need a work permit to take employment.
The court accepted that the Minister had discretion under section 4(7) of the Immigration Act 2004 to vary a permission, and could use reasonable policy guidelines. But it found that the decisions treated the policy for adult, non-immediate family members as decisive. They did not recognise that an exception could be considered or engage meaningfully with the circumstances put forward by the siblings.
The judge stressed that quashing the refusals did not mean the siblings should receive Stamp 4 permission. That decision remained for the Minister, who could again refuse after lawfully considering the evidence and policy. The court rejected the separate argument that the decisions gave no reasons: the basis for refusal had been stated. It found the reasoning inadequate in light of the failure to exercise the discretion lawfully.