The High Court ruled that surrendering a man to Hungary to serve an 18-month sentence would be proportionate, despite the effect on his family life in Ireland.
In a judgment delivered on 4 March 2011, Mr Justice John Edwards found that the surrender was not prohibited by Part 3 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 or by the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision. The court’s decision followed an application by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform under section 16 of the Act. The respondent did not consent to surrender.
The warrant, issued by Hungary on 24 November 2009, sought the respondent to serve a composite sentence imposed by the Szekszárd Municipal Court for two drug offences. The judgment says the sentence was reduced on appeal from two and a half years to 18 months. The court found that the warrant was in the correct form and that the statutory requirements concerning identity, endorsement, correspondence and minimum gravity were met. It also found that no statutory ground required refusal of surrender.
The respondent argued that surrender would be disproportionate and breach his constitutional and Convention rights to family life. His objections referred to his work and ties in Ireland and his planned marriage to an Irish partner. In an affidavit, he said he had come to Ireland in 2005, returned to Hungary for court appearances, and had since worked in several jobs. The court was told at the hearing that his marriage had taken place.
The respondent’s counsel characterised his role and the offences as relatively minor, relying on the Hungarian court judgments. Justice Edwards gave that submission little weight. He said an offence corresponding to possession of drugs for sale or supply could not be considered minor, that the Hungarian courts had already considered the mitigating factors, and that the public interest in the prosecution of crime and enforcement of the sentence had to be weighed.
Applying the proportionality approach set out in an earlier High Court decision, the judge accepted that surrender would interfere with the respondent’s family life. He found the interference was in accordance with law, pursued the legitimate aim of prosecuting crime and enforcing the sentence, and was justified by a pressing social need. The court concluded that surrender was proportionate and was not prohibited by the Act or Framework Decision.