The Court of Criminal Appeal quashed Martin Joyce’s conviction for keeping prohibited goods after finding that the search warrant used to seize evidence had been issued without authority.
In a judgment delivered by Macken J on 21 April 2008, the court held that the District Judge who issued the warrant was outside the district to which he was assigned. Under the law applicable when the warrant was issued, the judge had to be physically present in his assigned district to exercise the relevant power.
Joyce had been convicted of the offence under the Finance Act 1999, as amended, on 14 August 2003, and sentenced on 11 May 2007 to two years’ imprisonment. The charge concerned equipment and other goods allegedly kept at Primatestown, Ashbourne, County Meath, and said by the prosecution to be intended for, or used in, removing markers from mineral oil.
The warrant was issued by District Judge John Brophy on 14 August 2003. Brophy was permanently assigned to District Court Area No. 10, which included Dunshaughlin and the premises in question. As the District Court was not sitting there during the long vacation, the application was made at Brophy’s home, which was in the adjoining Dublin Metropolitan District Court Area.
The appeal turned on the Supreme Court’s decision in Creaven v Criminal Assets Bureau. The prosecution argued that Brophy was exercising jurisdiction only in respect of his assigned district, even though he issued the warrant from his home. The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected that interpretation, concluding that the earlier decision did not permit a judge to sit in another district to issue a warrant for premises in the district to which he was assigned.
The prosecution also argued that officers could have entered the premises and seized the goods under other statutory powers, and that the seized material could still be admitted despite the warrant’s invalidity. The court was not satisfied those powers covered all the materials seized. It also concluded that the principles in DPP v Kenny and DPP v Balfe did not allow the prosecution to rely on the evidence obtained under a warrant made without authority.
The court treated the application for leave to appeal as the appeal itself and allowed it on the warrant ground. It therefore quashed the conviction. It did not decide the separate ground concerning proof of statutory instruments and a commencement order. Nor did it make the requested order or give a direction about a possible retrial.