The Supreme Court has dismissed Michael Campbell’s appeal over whether his proceedings involving the Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland (MIBI) could continue without first going through the Personal Injuries Assessment Board (PIAB).
The Court held that the claim against the Bureau fell within the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003. It agreed with the High Court that the proceedings could not be issued without PIAB authorisation. The ruling concerned that preliminary procedural question; it did not decide the alleged negligence, assess damages or order the Bureau to pay compensation.
Campbell’s case arose from a road collision on 31 July 2002. He alleged that Gavin Boyle, who was driving a car owned by Padraig O’Donnell, crossed to the wrong side of the road and caused a head-on collision. Campbell sought to hold O’Donnell vicariously liable for Boyle’s alleged negligence. The judgment says the car driven by Boyle was not covered by an approved insurance policy at the time.
Campbell also sued the MIBI under a 1988 agreement between the Bureau and the Minister. He sought a declaration that, if a judgment against O’Donnell or Boyle remained unpaid after 28 days, he could recover the outstanding amount from the Bureau under the agreement.
The Bureau objected that Campbell had to apply to PIAB before bringing the proceedings. The High Court upheld that objection in July 2005. Campbell appealed, arguing that his claim against the Bureau was outside the Act because it sought enforcement of the agreement, rather than damages from a party responsible for the collision.
The Supreme Court said the claims against the car owner and driver were covered by the Act. It also found that the claim involving the Bureau came within the Act’s residual category for civil actions. The Court reasoned that the claim against the Bureau derived from the alleged negligence and was intended to recover damages assessed against the owner or driver. The Bureau was not itself alleged to have caused the injuries.
The Court rejected Campbell’s argument that the request for declaratory relief or performance of the agreement brought the case within an exception for claims involving another cause of action. It concluded those forms of relief did not create a separate, stand-alone claim. The appeal was dismissed.