The Supreme Court dismissed L. B.’s appeal against the striking out of his claim that the State should compensate him for property transferred to his former spouse under divorce orders. The Court held that the claim was bound to fail because the Constitution requires proper provision for a spouse in divorce proceedings and does not place that burden on the State.
The appeal concerned a High Court decision granting the State’s motion to dismiss the proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision. It also agreed that the proceedings could be dismissed on the basis of res judicata, after L. B.’s earlier challenge to the constitutionality of the relevant divorce legislation had failed.
The Court treated the appeal as arising at the stage of a motion to dismiss a claim as bound to fail. For that purpose, it assumed L. B. could establish his assertion that he had funded the assets and that they were solely his property. The judgment accepted that the orders deprived him of property interests in land and pension rights, but found no arguable basis for making the State liable to compensate him for that loss.
The orders followed divorce proceedings under the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996. The Circuit Court ordered that the family home be sold, with 35% of the net proceeds going to L. B. and the balance to Ms. B, and made a pension adjustment order for 20% of his pension. On appeal, the High Court changed the division to 40% for L. B. and increased the pension adjustment to 25%. The judgment said the details of those orders were not material to the Supreme Court appeal.
The Court reasoned that Article 41.3.2 of the Constitution requires proper provision to be made for a spouse when a divorce is granted. In an appropriate case, that can require one spouse to give up part of their property rights. The court making the order is fulfilling that constitutional duty; the State is not required to supply the provision or compensate the spouse whose property rights are affected.
The Court also rejected L. B.’s separation-of-powers arguments. It said the Oireachtas could set legally valid criteria for divorce-related orders, while the courts determine what provision is proper in the circumstances. The statute allowed a court to consider a spouse’s conduct where it would be unjust to disregard it; the Supreme Court made no finding about the conduct alleged in this case.
The Supreme Court did not decide the State’s cross-appeal over the High Court’s refusal to award it costs. That cross-appeal had been left over pending the substantive appeal.