The Supreme Court allowed Mark Finnegan’s appeal against a Court of Appeal decision that had set aside a High Court declaration concerning his 2014 arrest and return to prison. It held that, in the circumstances, returning him to custody to serve the balance of his sentence would be unjust, oppressive and invidious.
Mr Finnegan had been sentenced to 16 months in prison in May 2009 for allowing himself to be carried in a mechanically propelled vehicle without the owner’s consent. After two months in Wheatfield Prison, he was transferred to Shelton Abbey Open Centre. On 31 October 2009, he walked out without permission and was unlawfully at large.
The prison authorities notified Arklow Garda Station, but a human error meant the escape was not recorded on the Garda PULSE system and no nationwide alert was issued. Mr Finnegan returned to his family home in Tallaght and later lived with his partner at another Tallaght address. He claimed social welfare from both addresses. The judgment says Garda efforts to locate him began around June 2014. He presented himself at Tallaght Garda Station on 10 November 2014 and was arrested and returned to Wheatfield Prison.
The High Court had declared the arrest unlawful, finding that the delay breached constitutional justice. The Court of Appeal overturned that decision, reasoning that the authorities had a duty to return an escaped prisoner to custody and that fair-procedure rights did not apply to the process. The Supreme Court’s appeal decision concerned whether delay in arresting an absconding prisoner could make the arrest and detention unlawful.
A dispute remained about whether Mr Finnegan misled gardaí about his identity in 2014. The Supreme Court did not resolve it. It followed the High Court’s approach and assessed the admitted period during which no steps were taken to locate or arrest him: from 31 October 2009 to 1 June 2014, four years and seven months.
The judgment said each case must be assessed on its circumstances, including the person’s conduct, the offence and sentence, the length of delay and the explanation for it. Applying that approach, the court considered both Mr Finnegan’s deliberate escape and the prolonged period before any steps were taken, during which he lived openly in his home area and engaged in family life. It concluded that, despite the seriousness of remaining unlawfully at large, returning him to serve the balance of his sentence would be unjust, oppressive and invidious. The court therefore allowed the appeal.