The Supreme Court allowed J.McN.’s appeal and dismissed proceedings seeking more than €3.3 million in tax and interest, finding that the evidence did not establish the authority of the Revenue Bureau officer who brought the claim in the name of the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) to sue in his own name.
The judgment, delivered by Clarke J. on 25 May 2017, concerned summary proceedings for €3,313,990.15, comprising €1,791,168.75 in tax and €1,522,821.40 in interest calculated to 27 September 2007, plus continuing interest. The CAB’s case was that assessments had been raised for the 2000/1 tax year and each year from 2001 to 2005, and had become final because no timely appeal was lodged. J.McN. was said to dispute that the assessments reflected the tax actually due.
The Master had initially allowed final judgment to be entered. The High Court dismissed J.McN.’s appeal from that decision in 2009 and affirmed the order. The Supreme Court considered several grounds of appeal but resolved the case on the officer’s capacity to bring the proceedings.
The officer was identified only as “Revenue Bureau Officer 32”. The Court accepted that a CAB officer could use CAB’s name under the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996. But it said the evidence still had to establish a legal basis for that officer to sue for the tax.
A certificate under section 966(3) of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 could have provided prima facie proof that the officer was authorised to sue in his own name. No such certificate was produced. The Court held that the certificate was not the only possible way to establish authority, but the other evidence showed only that the officer had been nominated to exercise the Collector General’s powers on the Collector General’s behalf. It did not establish authority to sue in the officer’s own name.
The Court also rejected reliance on a document filed as a “defence and counterclaim” that did not deny the pleaded assertion of authority. In summary summons proceedings, the document had been filed before leave to defend was granted and had no legal effect; it could not amount to an admission of the officer’s authority.
The Supreme Court substituted an order dismissing the proceedings. It stressed that dismissal did not prevent a duly authorised person from bringing fresh proceedings to recover taxes properly due. The Court expressed no view on whether J.McN. could obtain an extension of time to appeal the assessments, whether such an application would succeed, or whether the assessments were correct. It did not decide the other grounds of appeal.