The High Court has upheld the refusal to dismiss a drunk-driving prosecution over delay, answering yes to both legal questions put to it on appeal by way of case stated. The court accepted that the delay was excessive but concluded it did not breach the accused’s constitutional right to an expeditious trial.
The prosecution concerned an alleged offence on 2 June 2002 under section 49 of the Road Traffic Acts. The accused appeared in the District Court on 23 September 2004. He had asked the District Court judge to strike out the charge because of delay; the judge refused, heard the case and convicted him.
The case was first listed for hearing on 17 October 2003, but that date was vacated because it clashed with a judges’ conference. The parties were notified in advance. A later hearing date was set by letter for 28 June 2004. Both sides attended, but the case was not on that day’s list: it had been listed for 29 June, when the court was hearing family-law matters. The case was then adjourned and heard on 23 September 2004.
The accused’s counsel argued that the overall delay was unconscionably long and that prejudice could be inferred even without specific evidence. The Director of Public Prosecutions’ counsel accepted there had been delay but argued that no specific prejudice or anxiety had been shown, and that the missed dates did not reflect systemic failure to provide court time.
Justice Dunne applied the two-part approach described in an earlier High Court decision, D.P.P. v. Arthurs: whether the delay caused specific prejudice or created a necessary inference of a real risk of an unfair trial; and whether the reasons for the delay justified dismissing the case even if prejudice was not established.
On the first part, the High Court noted there was no evidence of actual identifiable prejudice before the District Court and no suggestion in the case stated that the accused had been unable to defend the case after the witnesses were heard. It found no basis to infer a real risk that the trial was unfair.
On the second part, the judge distinguished this case from Arthurs, where repeated failures to hear a case because of overcrowded lists had added to the delay. Here, the first adjournment was notified in advance and arose from an unusual scheduling clash; the later listing error was unfortunate but was not a systemic failure to provide for an expeditious trial. The court acknowledged the excessive delay but held that it did not amount to an invasion of the accused’s constitutional right. It therefore answered both questions in favour of the District Court judge’s decision to refuse dismissal.