The High Court refused five applicants leave to seek an order requiring the Minister for Justice and Equality to decide their application for leave to remain in Ireland. The applicants were two parents and their three children. The court held they had not demonstrated substantial grounds for the proposed judicial review.
The parents, identified in the judgment as Mauritian nationals, came to Ireland in January 2007 on student visas, which expired in March 2012. Their children were born in Ireland. After enquiries and correspondence about permission to remain, the Minister issued a notice under section 3 of the Immigration Act 1999 on 25 May 2016. The family made representations on 15 June 2016.
The applicants later sent three letters asking for a decision within 28 days. In December 2016, they also sought priority. The Minister replied in January 2017 that the case was among many under consideration and no specific completion date could be given, but said there would be no avoidable delay.
The family argued that the period of delay should be counted from December 2012, when correspondence about regularising their status began. Justice O’Regan rejected that approach, saying it would effectively recognise an entitlement to require a section 3 notice at a date chosen by the applicants. She said the delay had to be assessed from the submission of their representations in June 2016.
The judgment said an order of mandamus requires more than a duty to make a decision. The applicants had to show an express or implied wrongful refusal, or delay so egregious and unjustified that it was tantamount to refusal. The judge noted that the decision sought was discretionary and distinguished an earlier case relied on by the applicants, which involved an EU law issue.
The applicants had cited a job offer for the father and a medical report concerning the mother’s health. The judge said those matters arose before the section 3 notice and representations, and appeared to stem from the family’s failure to maintain permission status rather than delay by the Minister. The applicants did not allege that the Minister’s handling was capricious or arbitrary.
The court concluded that the asserted delay was not egregious or tantamount to refusal, the Minister’s explanation was reasonable, and there was nothing exceptional in the applicants’ position or the Minister’s conduct. It refused leave to pursue the proposed judicial review. The judgment addressed leave only; it did not decide the family’s underlying application for permission to remain.