The Supreme Court dismissed Mark Crawford’s appeal against his murder conviction, with Hogan J. agreeing that the jury had rejected his self-defence argument. He said applying the statutory test for self-defence would not have changed the outcome.
In a separate judgment delivered on 14 October 2024, Hogan J. addressed whether section 18 of the Non-Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997 applies to homicide cases. He concluded that the section sets out the self-defence law for all offences, including fatal offences, and that the common law rules in DPP v Dwyer no longer govern that defence.
Hogan J. said section 18’s language did not distinguish between fatal and non-fatal offences. He also relied on section 22(2), which abolishes common law defences concerning the use of force covered by sections 18 and 19. Reading section 18 as limited to non-fatal offences, he reasoned, could create inconsistent tests where one incident led to both a death and a serious injury.
The judgment considered the Act’s title, which refers to non-fatal offences, but said a short title cannot narrow otherwise clear language in the statute. Hogan J. also rejected arguments based on the presumption against unclear changes in the law and the principle that legislation is presumed to reflect established judicial interpretations. He said the statutory wording showed an intention to restate self-defence law, despite the earlier Dwyer decision.
Hogan J. agreed with Donnelly J.’s judgment on the substantive issues and with dismissing the appeal. He said the jury’s verdict had rejected the defence advanced, so the interpretation of section 18 did not alter the result in Crawford’s case. The source contains Hogan J.’s judgment only; it does not set out the underlying evidence or the full reasoning in Donnelly J.’s judgment.