The High Court has refused to surrender an anonymised woman to Latvia under two European arrest warrants, finding that separation from her two young sons would carry a significant risk of irreparable emotional and psychological harm.
In a judgment delivered on 20 February 2015, Mr Justice Edwards upheld the woman’s objection under section 37(1)(a) of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003. He found that surrender in the circumstances would be disproportionate and breach the family life rights of the woman and her children under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
One warrant, issued in May 2011, sought her return to face prosecution for two alleged thefts of packets of coffee. The other, issued in July 2011, sought her return to serve a one-year sentence for nine thefts. The court found the warrants met the statutory requirements for surrender, including the applicable seriousness thresholds. It also found there was no issue about trial in absentia.
The woman opposed surrender on family life and proportionality grounds. Evidence before the court included her affidavit and a clinical psychologist’s report. The psychologist assessed the sons as vulnerable and said separation from their mother would likely cause significant harm. She described the older boy as particularly at risk because of previous losses and emotional difficulties. An addendum raised concerns about the suitability of the younger child’s father as a carer for the older boy, based on reported domestic violence, and recommended a comprehensive assessment before he took on that role.
The judge assessed the public interest in surrender as medium on a five-point scale. He considered the low value of the thefts and the one-year sentence, alongside the woman’s repeated offending, the breach of probation conditions and the fact that she had left Latvia. He rejected the argument that delay had weakened the case for surrender, finding the delays modest and substantially contributed to by the woman.
The court accepted that surrender was likely to cause significant emotional and behavioural harm to both children, particularly the older son. With hesitation, the judge concluded that this risk outweighed the public interest in surrender. He said he would not refuse surrender if the woman’s circumstances alone were considered, but the children’s best interests had to be taken into account.
The court upheld the objection under section 37(1)(a) in both proceedings and declined to order surrender. It did not entertain the separate constitutional objection under section 37(1)(b).