The High Court dismissed a man’s objection to surrender to the United Kingdom under a European arrest warrant, finding that the time elapsed did not justify refusing surrender or seeking further information from the UK authority. The court said it would make a surrender order under section 16 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003.
The warrant, issued on 18 December 2019, seeks the respondent’s surrender for prosecution over alleged sexual assault and failing to surrender. The judgment gives maximum penalties of 10 years’ imprisonment for the first offence and one year for the second. It does not determine whether he committed either offence.
The warrant was endorsed by the High Court on 2 March 2020, and the respondent was arrested and brought before the court on 25 May. Justice Paul Burns said he was satisfied that the respondent was the person named in the warrant, that the minimum gravity threshold was met, and that the offences corresponded to similar offences in Ireland. The respondent’s counsel had conceded the correspondence point.
The respondent argued that the delay between the alleged offence and the warrant was significant enough to warrant refusal of surrender or a request for an explanation from the UK issuing authority. He relied on no particular prejudice and filed no affidavit addressing his objections. A proposed issue about possible deportation to France was not pursued at the hearing.
The judgment says the alleged sexual assault occurred between 11 January and 11 February 2011. The respondent was arrested and interviewed, and a decision to charge him was made on 20 May 2011. His case was later sent from Grimsby Magistrates’ Court to the Crown Court. He failed to appear at the first Crown Court hearing, on 9 August 2011.
The court also referred to evidence at a bail hearing that the respondent had spent part of the period after failing to appear in France, had applied for asylum there, and had a Ukrainian driving licence when arrested in Ireland. Evidence of his use of aliases was also mentioned. Justice Burns said the respondent had identified no prejudice or unusual circumstances that would make the delay truly exceptional or egregious. He therefore dismissed the objection and said no further information was needed from the issuing authority.
The judgment states that surrender was not prohibited under Part 3 of the Act. Its concluding wording is that the court “would make” the section 16 surrender order.