The High Court has dismissed Francis Davey’s damages claim against Ulster Bank Ireland Limited after finding that almost seven years of inactivity made a fair trial no longer possible.
In a judgment delivered on 8 December 2023, Ms Justice Stack granted the bank’s application to dismiss the proceedings for inordinate and inexcusable delay, using the court’s inherent jurisdiction. She also dismissed, as a consequence, Davey’s application for an injunction and related Mareva relief. The court did not decide the underlying allegations about the bank’s advice, the loans or the disputed facilities.
Davey issued the proceedings in May 2013, following demand letters seeking repayment of sums the bank said were owed. His amended claim centred on an alleged conversation in 2006. He said the bank encouraged him to roll over existing facilities and buy further investment properties, instead of selling properties to clear his borrowing, and that its conduct took on the role of financial adviser. The judgment did not determine whether that advice was given or whether the bank was liable.
The bank’s defence included a counterclaim for more than €5.5 million on the loans and about €203,000 under a guarantee. The judgment records that the bank no longer pursued that counterclaim after the loans were transferred to Promontoria Aran Ltd in February 2015. It also notes that the central damages claim concerned alleged advice in 2006; disputes about the receivers and the transferred loans were separate issues.
After the plaintiff’s appeal against refusal of an amendment was withdrawn in October 2016, the court found that no formal steps were taken in the proceedings until the bank’s dismissal motion issued in July 2023. Davey told the court he still wished to amend his claim and seek further discovery, but had not brought the required motions. The judge found the delay inordinate and inexcusable. She accepted that the pandemic and the death of Davey’s son could account for some time, but not the overall delay. She also found that activity in separate receivers’ proceedings did not excuse leaving this claim unadvanced, particularly given an undertaking to expedite it.
The court focused on the alleged 2006 conversation, which would require significant oral evidence. The judge concluded that, with a trial unlikely before 2025, assessing a disputed conversation nearly 19 years after it took place would be unfair to the bank. A separate data-protection complaint concerned an email incident in 2011 and would also face a lengthy delay before trial.
The judge refused Davey’s attempts to cross-examine two deponents because the applications were not formally before the court under prior directions. She said she would have refused one of them in any event, as the relevant fact—that the employee had been identified to the bank in correspondence—was conceded. The underlying merits of the claim were not adjudicated.