The Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal challenging the adjournment of sentencing for offences to which Gareth Hill had pleaded guilty. It held that the Circuit Court could wait for the outcome of his trial on separate charges before sentencing him.
The judgment, delivered by Kennedy J. on 28 February 2019, concerned the refusal of declaratory relief by the High Court. Hill had also sought certiorari, but the appeal addressed only the declaratory relief. The High Court had refused his judicial review application on 24 April 2018.
Hill was awaiting trial on charges under sections 3, 15 and 15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, relating to alleged offences in August 2016. He had pleaded not guilty to those charges. Separately, he pleaded guilty to drug offences under sections 3 and 15 of the Act, arising from his possession of controlled substances while on bail. He affirmed those pleas before the Circuit Court on 26 May 2017 and asked to be sentenced immediately.
The prosecution successfully sought an adjournment of sentencing until 3 November 2017, so the trial on the 2016 charges could take place first. The stated reason was that a conviction on those charges could have consequences for sentencing under section 11 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984, which addresses consecutive sentences for offences committed while on bail. The sentencing matter and the pending trial were later stayed during Hill’s judicial review proceedings.
Hill argued that the legislation did not require or authorise delaying sentence and that the adjournment affected both the presumption of innocence on the pending charges and his right to prompt sentencing. The Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that the Circuit Court had discretion to organise the sequence of proceedings and that no rule required sentence to be imposed immediately.
The Court of Appeal found no error in the High Court’s conclusion that the adjournment was within the Circuit Court’s discretion. It said the decision did not predetermine the jury’s decision on the pending charges or undermine Hill’s presumption of innocence. The sentencing judge could take account of Hill’s status after the trial when deciding sentence on the guilty pleas.
On delay, the court said the interval between conviction and sentence must not be unreasonably long and an adjournment must be proper and proportionate. It concluded that waiting for the trial’s outcome was proportionate in the circumstances and did not breach Hill’s legal or constitutional rights. The appeal was dismissed; the judgment did not determine the outcome of the pending trial or impose sentence on the guilty pleas.