The High Court refused Paul Maye’s application for judicial review seeking recognition of a default planning permission for a redevelopment of The Blue Lagoon site in Sligo. The court held that the council’s decision was late, but found the proposed development, as revised, would materially contravene the development plan. It also said it would have exercised its discretion against recognising a default permission on a separate ground.
The proposal involved demolishing the existing pub, nightclub and dwelling at Crozon Crescent, Riverside, and replacing them with a complex including a pub, a nightclub with capacity for 1,900 people, offices, parking and other works. Maye applied to Sligo Borough Council on 21 December 2005. After the council requested further information, his response was received on 16 August 2006. The council refused permission on 20 September.
Maye argued that the four-week statutory period for the council to decide the application began when it received the further information. The council’s position was that time restarted only after a newspaper notice about that information was published and a copy reached the council. The court accepted Maye’s interpretation: the period began when the requested information was supplied. It concluded that the council’s decision was out of time and that a default permission therefore arose prima facie, subject to the legal limits on such permissions.
The court held that a default permission could not arise for a proposal that materially contravened the development plan. It rejected the council’s broader argument that courts should refuse default permission whenever a development would not ordinarily be approved, saying that would require courts to make planning judgments beyond their proper role.
The court was not persuaded that the proposed nightclub’s scale or location, by itself, breached the plan. It found, however, that a revised road layout required widening the road and taking land from a grassy area intended to form part of a linear park along the Garvogue River. The court concluded that this would materially conflict with the plan’s objective for the park. Because the proposal, as revised, materially contravened the plan, it could not receive default permission.
The judge also addressed the council’s alternative argument about discretion. The council had told Maye that it considered the decision period would run from receipt of the newspaper advertisement, and Maye did not tell the council he disputed that view. The judge made no finding that Maye or his advisers deliberately misled the council, but said the council was reasonably entitled to think its position was uncontested. On that ground alone, the judge said he would have refused to recognise a default permission even if the development had not materially contravened the plan. The application was refused.