The High Court has ruled that Peter Hynes’s proceedings against Allied Irish Banks plc were statute barred when issued, and dismissed them. The ruling followed a trial of a preliminary issue: whether the proceedings were out of time under the limitation rules for defamation actions. The court did not decide the underlying defamation allegations on their merits.
AIB obtained a €7,563.85 judgment against Hynes in Roscommon Circuit Court in March 2011, in default of appearance. The bank registered a judgment mortgage against his property in Roscommon on 20 November 2012. A deed releasing the mortgage was registered in September 2013, and the judgment itself was set aside in September 2014.
Hynes issued proceedings in February 2015. He alleged that registering the mortgage conveyed that he had reneged on a debt, could not pay his debts and was not creditworthy. He also claimed that the registration remained accessible to the public and caused reputational and financial harm. AIB disputed the claims and argued that the defamation action was late because the limitation period began when the mortgage was first registered.
Hynes argued that time should run from when the judgment was set aside, or that the registration amounted to a continuing publication. He also relied on statutory provisions concerning fraudulent concealment, saying he did not learn of the mortgage until March 2014. The court rejected those arguments. It found that the defamation cause of action accrued on first publication, which it identified as 12 November 2012. It said later searches did not create fresh causes of action and that the release of the mortgage or setting aside of the judgment did not change the accrual date.
On concealment, the judge found no evidence that AIB had tried to hide the registration. The court noted that a solicitor’s letter referring to the mortgage was read to Hynes by telephone in October 2013, and said reasonable diligence would have included a search of the Registry of Deeds. Hynes had not sought an extension within the statutory period.
The court also rejected the argument that negligence or other pleaded claims could survive separately. It concluded that the alleged financial losses, including effects on credit, were in substance claims about financial reputation and therefore remained defamation claims. The preliminary issue was answered by finding the proceedings statute barred on the date they were issued. The proceedings were dismissed insofar as they concerned defamation; the judgment’s final answer treated the proceedings as statute barred.