The Court of Appeal has quashed seven convictions against Gerard Mounsey for knowingly or wilfully delivering incorrect income tax returns, after finding that two substantial grounds of appeal succeeded.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Birmingham on 19 October 2015, concerned returns for the years of assessment 2003 to 2009. The court found that the defence had been denied information about how tax assessments were calculated, and that evidence did not establish the statutory basis for continuing Mr Mounsey’s detention after the investigation shifted to tax offences.
The convictions followed a jury trial in July 2013. The Court of Appeal rejected several other grounds, including challenges to evidence about a fictitious car-sales business and amended tax returns, and complaints about the trial judge’s directions to the jury.
On disclosure, the court said the assessments had prompted amended returns and were central to the case. The prosecution refused to provide a breakdown of how the assessments had been reached, and the trial judge declined to order disclosure. The appeal court held that the refusal left the defence hampered in addressing the assessments and amounted to an effective reversal of the burden of proof.
The court also considered the fourth interview with Mr Mounsey, conducted after his detention was changed from an investigation into making a gain by deception to one concerning incorrect tax returns. It said the evidence showed that an investigating garda requested the change and that the member in charge acted on it, but did not establish whether he independently considered the statutory requirements for continued detention. The court held that the challenge to the detention and the resulting interview evidence was well-founded.
The court declined to apply the proviso, which could have allowed convictions to stand despite errors, describing the successful grounds as points of substance. It quashed the convictions and said the judgment dealt only with Mr Mounsey’s appeal against conviction. The Director of Public Prosecutions had separately sought a review of the sentences for undue leniency; that matter was not determined in this judgment.