The Court of Appeal allowed Times Newspapers Ltd.’s appeal against an order requiring it to disclose documents in a defamation action brought by Lynda Meegan. The court said the request was premature because the newspaper’s fair and reasonable publication defence was pleaded in general terms and its factual basis had not been clarified.
The case concerns a Sunday Times article published on 14 September 2014. It alleged that a former Garda officer had sent information to a senior Continuity IRA figure. Meegan says she is the person referred to in the article and that its allegations about her are false and defamatory. The newspaper does not dispute that she is the person referred to, but pleaded that she was not identifiable from the article.
The newspaper also invoked the defence under section 26 of the Defamation Act 2009, which concerns fair and reasonable publication on a matter of public interest. Meegan sought reporters’ notebooks, drafts and other background material, along with editorial schedules and advice concerning the decision not to publish her name.
The High Court ordered discovery on the basis that the section 26 plea put the fairness and reasonableness of publication in issue. It refused discovery on a separate argument that the documents could show why the newspaper chose not to name Meegan; no appeal was brought against that part of the decision.
The Court of Appeal held that documents such as journalists’ notes might be relevant in some cases involving a section 26 defence, but a party seeking discovery must show that the documents are both relevant and necessary to the particular defence. Here, the newspaper’s pleading did not explain the grounds on which it would rely, and Meegan had not first sought particulars to clarify them. The court said the request could otherwise amount to broad discovery of material that might possibly be relevant.
The appeal concerned the discovery order, not whether the article was defamatory or whether the section 26 defence would succeed. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the discovery order at that stage. It said Meegan could seek particulars and, if the defence’s scope and factual basis were later clarified, could apply for discovery again, with reasons explaining why the requested material was relevant and necessary.