The Supreme Court dismissed M.M.’s appeal challenging a November 2007 renewal order that continued his detention at the Central Mental Hospital. The court held that both the psychiatrist who had treated him through Cork services and the psychiatrist responsible for his day-to-day care in the hospital could fall within the statutory description of the doctor authorised to renew an admission order.
The appeal was brought under Article 40.4.2 of the Constitution, which concerns an application for release from detention. M.M. argued that the renewal order was invalid because it had been signed by Dr. John Cooney, rather than by Dr. Dearbhla Duffy, the consultant psychiatrist in day-to-day charge of him at the Central Mental Hospital. The respondent relied on the order to justify his continued detention. The Mental Health Tribunal was joined as a notice party because of its functions under the Mental Health Act 2001.
M.M. had first been detained in Cork in 1998 under the Mental Treatment Act 1945 and was later transferred to the Central Mental Hospital in Dundrum. When the 2001 Act came into operation on 1 November 2006, a transitional provision treated people detained under specified parts of the earlier Act as involuntarily admitted to the institution where they were held. The challenge concerned a renewal order made under section 15 of the 2001 Act on 27 November 2007. The judgment did not challenge the validity of M.M.’s detention before that order.
Section 15(2) allows a renewal order to be made by “the consultant psychiatrist responsible for the care and treatment” of the patient. The Supreme Court said that phrase was not defined in the Act. It agreed with the High Court that, on the evidence, both Dr. Cooney and Dr. Duffy could meet the description. Dr. Cooney was not in day-to-day charge, but he described himself as responsible for M.M.’s overall care, said he maintained contact with him and his family, and had discussed the certification with colleagues at the Central Mental Hospital. Dr. Duffy’s evidence supported the account of care involving more than one treating consultant along a continuing pathway.
The court said that either doctor’s signature would have made the renewal order valid, so it was unnecessary to decide which one the statutory wording would identify if it permitted only one. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It did not order M.M.’s release; the challenge to the renewal order failed.